ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relative earnings informativeness of recognized versus disclosed fair values. While prior literature documents valuation differences across recognized versus disclosed financial information, it is silent on attributing such differences across two theoretical causes: lower reliability of the disclosed information, and/or its incomplete processing by investors. To address this issue, we use the unique setting of European real estate firms reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards, which require that the fair values of investment properties either be recognized on the balance sheet ("recognition firms") or disclosed in the footnotes ("disclosure firms"). Using this latter disclosure, we obtain comparable earnings constructs that include unrealized fair value changes for both sets of firms. We find that fair value-based earnings is less informative for disclosure firms, consistent with greater noise in disclosed versus recognized fair values. Further evidence supports lower reliability of disclosed fair values-reflected in improved earnings informativeness for those disclosure firms using external appraisers to derive fair value estimates-but fails to support incomplete processing of disclosed information by investors. Overall, these findings are consistent with lower reliability of disclosed fair values explaining its lower earnings informativeness relative to recognized fair values.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the effect of recognition versus disclosure of fair values on earnings informativeness. While prior research documents valuation differences across recognized versus disclosed financial statement items, it fails to distinguish between two potential explanations: appropriate discounting of disclosed information due its lower reliability, and/or investor fixation on recognized information and thus incomplete processing of disclosed items (Bernard and Schipper 1994) . Accordingly, we build on this literature by examining whether earnings based on disclosed fair values is less informative relative to that based on recognized fair values, and whether any such differences are attributable to lower ex ante reliability and/or incomplete processing by investors of disclosed fair values.
We choose as our setting investment property (i.e., real estate) firms domiciled in the First, it provides a group of firms having a homogenous primary operating asset for which fair value information is highly relevant: investment property, representing over 70% of the sample firms' total assets. Second, it provides a key source of variation across the recognition versus disclosure of fair values for these assets. Specifically, IFRS require firms to either recognize investment property fair values on the balance sheet with changes recognized in net income (we designate these as "recognition firms"), or disclose these fair values in the footnotes, with the balance sheet and income statement reflecting an amortizedcost basis (we designate these as "disclosure firms"). Third, this single-industry setting minimizes cross-industry variation that can affect earnings informativeness; further, this industry minimizes potential alternative effects likely present in other industries having substantial fair value reporting (e.g., regulation in the banking industry). Finally, this setting provides an economically significant sample of almost 200 publicly-traded firms with an aggregate market value of over €150 billion.
We develop and test three expectations. First, to examine whether recognition versus disclosure affects earnings informativeness, we build on prior research that characterizes earnings informativeness as the ability of financial statement elements to capture or summarize information (Francis and Schipper 1999) . Accordingly, we model earnings as a signal; noise in this signal can reduce the price reaction to it (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988) . Earnings in the real estate industry is characterized by three main components: rental income; realized gains/losses due to property disposals; and unrealized gains/losses on value changes of retained property. Because these firms typically hold property portfolios for long time periods, this latter component often represents the most significant change in firm value.
The earnings of recognition firms reflects all three components, as all changes in fair values flow through net income for these firms. In contrast, the earnings of disclosure firms excludes unrealized gains and losses. To allow direct comparisons of earnings across the recognition and disclosure firm groupings, we use the mandatory fair value disclosures to restate earnings of disclosure firms to include these unrealized gains and losses. Following the literature on recognition versus disclosure (Bernard and Schipper 1994) , we expect disclosed financial data will be underweighted by investors relative to recognized data. That is, we expect the fair value-based earnings of disclosure firms to have lower informativeness relative to that of recognition firms.
Next, we examine two potential explanations for observed differences across recognition versus disclosure: 'differential reliability' (i.e., that markets are efficient, and appropriately view disclosed information as having lower reliability); or 'incomplete processing' (i.e., that markets are inefficient). Under differential reliability, disclosed information is viewed as containing greater noise (i.e., more measurement error), owing to greater scrutiny of recognized data by both internal (e.g., management) and external (e.g., auditor) forces. Thus, we examine the role of reliability in observed differences in earnings informativeness across recognition versus disclosure. Our industry setting is unique through its use of a critical monitor-the external appraiser-which provides a strong measure of ex ante reliability (e.g., Dietrich et al. 2001) . Accordingly, we expect that disclosure firms can improve earnings informativeness through greater ex ante reliability of their fair value measures, evidenced via use of an external appraiser. Related, we examine whether incomplete processing accounts for any differences in earnings informativeness across the recognition and disclosure firm groupings. Under this theory, more sophisticated (less sophisticated) investors are better able (less able) to value reporting signals. To proxy for sophisticated investors, we use the percentage of closely held shares, which should reflect owners having greater access to underlying economic value changes. Accordingly, we expect that earnings informativeness of disclosure firms to be increasing for those firms having a higher percentage of such investors.
Empirical results reveal that earnings informativeness is lower for disclosure firms relative to recognition firms, consistent with equity market participants viewing the earnings of disclosure firms as containing greater noise. We further find support for the differential reliability explanation, as earnings informativeness for disclosure firms increases for those disclosure firms employing external appraisers. This is consistent with equity market participants viewing earnings of disclosure firms using external appraisers as having higher reliability. We fail to find support for the incomplete processing explanation, as we fail to find evidence that earnings informativeness is higher for disclosure firms with higher levels of closely held shares. These results are consistent across a wide range of sensitivity analyses including: controlling for self-selection of firms into the recognition versus disclosure groupings; using a balance sheet (versus returns) specification; and incorporating earnings changes as explanatory variables into the specification. Overall, we conclude that earnings informativeness is lower when based on disclosed versus recognized fair values, and this appears attributable primarily to the lower ex ante reliability of disclosed fair values. This paper makes two primary contributions. First, we document that the informativeness of earnings is lower for firms disclosing versus recognizing fair values for non-financial assets. This suggests that earnings signals derived from disclosed financial information are noisier relative to those derived from recognized financial information. As such, we extend previous findings of valuation differences across recognized versus disclosed reporting items (e.g., Davis-Friday et al. 1999; Ahmed et al. 2006) to the fair value setting.
Second, we address the reason for this finding by documenting that greater ex ante reliability of disclosed information-reflected in the use of an external monitor-increases earnings informativeness. This latter finding is consistent with market agents in an efficient market perceiving disclosed information as having lower reliability. Both findings contribute to previous studies on recognition versus disclosure (Bernard and Schipper 1994) , as well as to the literature on fair value reporting by documenting that disclosure and recognition are not substitutes. However, the informativeness of financial constructs-such as earnings -derived from disclosed fair value data can be enhanced through commitments to greater ex ante reliability, such as use of an external appraiser.
Section II provides background on the institutional setting of the European investment property industry and related financial reporting. Section III reviews the prior literature and hypothesis development. Section IV describes the research design. Section V presents the primary empirical results, and Section VI the sensitivity results. Section VII concludes. mandates that all firms present fair values for their primary operating asset (investment property), using either recognition (i.e., under the fair value model) or disclosure (i.e., under the cost model). Throughout this paper, we refer to firms choosing the fair value model as "recognition firms," and to firms choosing the cost model as "disclosure firms." 1 Thus, investment property differs from real estate assets used for production or administrative purposes.
II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The income statement depiction of this business model thus differs across these two firm groupings. Specifically, the reported earnings of recognition firms reflect all three earnings components described above, while the reported earnings of disclosure firms omits unrealized investment property fair value gains on retained property. 2 The latter is likely a key component of firm performance as our sample firms typically have long investment horizons, making unrealized changes in property fair values a relevant component of economic earnings for investors. We use the mandated disclosure of fair values by disclosure firms to derive "fair value-based" earnings constructs for these firms. 3 This allows comparisons of the informativeness of recognition firms' reported earnings with that of disclosure firms' restated, equivalent "fair value-based" earnings.
Our setting also allows us to investigate whether any differences in earnings informativeness are explained by variation in the reliability of fair value measurement ('differential reliability'), or by the extent to which disclosed fair value information is processed by investors ('incomplete processing'). Regarding variation in reliability, IAS 40
recommends, but does not require, use of an external appraiser to derive fair value estimates under either model. Accordingly, we exploit variation in our sample firms' deriving of fair value estimates through either external appraisers or internal valuations. To the extent that external appraisers act as alternative monitors, the (perceived) ex ante reliability of investment property fair values should be higher for fair values calculated by external appraisers, relative to fair values estimated by internal staff. Regarding the processing of recognized versus disclosed fair value information by investors, our setting is characterized by sample firms having a diverse ownership base. To the extent that more sophisticated 2
The reported earnings of disclosure firms will include unrealized investment property fair value losses on retained property where existing asset impairment rules under IFRS trigger asset write-offs to the extent that investment property fair values fall below amortized cost-based carrying amounts.
3
Appendix A explains our calculation of restated fair value-based earnings for disclosure firms.
investors process disclosed information more fully than less sophisticated investors, the degree of information processing should vary with a measure of investor sophistication.
In summary, the European real estate industry setting provides the following unique advantages that allow us to contribute to the recognition versus disclosure literature. First, this industry is characterized by a single primary operating asset: investment property, for which fair value information is highly relevant. Second, while fair value accounting is increasingly prevalent within financial reporting, few settings allow simultaneous observation of recognized and disclosed fair values for a single, material asset class. The investment property industry provides this latter variation, as well as observed variation in other pertinent attributes (including in ex ante reliability of these fair value estimates, as well as in investor sophistication) that we exploit in our analyses. Third, this single-industry setting minimizes variation in institutional factors that can affect inferences about earnings informativeness.
Related, most other settings exhibiting fair value reporting are also subject to substantial regulations (such as banks and insurance firms), which complicate both implementation (e.g., as regulations can differ across countries) and inferences (e.g., as attribution to financial reporting requirements can be confounded by alternative regulatory requirements). Finally, the investment property industry is well-developed, with close to 200 publicly-traded firms domiciled in Europe. This provides both a sufficient sample size, as well as an economically significant group of firms with a combined market capitalization of over €150 billion.
III. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Prior Literature
This paper builds on two streams of literature. First, we add to the literature analyzing whether recognition versus disclosure of financial reporting information has differential valuation implications (Bernard and Schipper 1994) . 4 Prior papers provide evidence that disclosed items have some association with market measures, particularly equity prices (e.g., Landsman 1986; Harris and Ohlson 1987; Barth 1991) . However, while experimental research suggests that recognition versus disclosure influences financial statements users'
perceptions (e.g., Harper et al. 1987; Bloomfield and Libby 1996; Viger et al. 2008) , empirical papers are inconclusive on whether disclosed information is processed completely (e.g., Landsman and Ohlson 1990; Amir 1993; Hall 1993; Barth 1994) , and whether recognition and disclosure are equivalent in terms of their capital-market implications (Aboody 1996; Davis-Friday et al. 1999; Espahbodi et al. 2002; Ahmed et al. 2006 ). The latter issue has been addressed by exploiting cross-sectional variation (i.e., management having discretion to recognize or disclose an item, such as the oil and gas industry in Aboody 1996), as well as intertemporal variation (i.e., mandatory accounting changes moving reported items from required disclosure to required recognition, such as reporting for postretirement benefits in Davis-Friday et al. 1999) . One challenge facing the latter studies is that concurrent changes in the information properties can provide an alternative explanation for differential valuation across recognition and disclosure.
Importantly, prior papers do not address the potential explanations for observed differences across recognized versus disclosed amounts: 'differential relevance/reliability' and 'incomplete processing' (Bernard and Schipper 1994) . 5 Differential relevance/reliability suggests that disclosed amounts are appropriately viewed by agents in an efficient market as having lower relevance and/or reliability. In contrast, incomplete processing suggests that 4
There is little evidence on whether recognition versus disclosure affects contracting in financial reporting.
5
One exception is Choudhary (2011) , which examines fair values of employee stock options. The paper provides evidence consistent with firms reporting under a recognition regime having different incentives than firms reporting under a disclosure regime, which translates into differential degrees of 'quality' for recognized versus disclosed information. However, Choudhary (2011) does not address the valuation implications of the information characteristics stemming from these differences in reporting incentives.
capital-market participants do not fully incorporate information residing in disclosed amounts; this casts doubt on market efficiency.
The second stream of literature we build upon examines the relation of fair values and equity prices. Several earlier studies provide evidence that disclosed fair values of financial instruments (e.g., Eccher et al. 1996) and some non-financial asset classes (e.g., Easton et al., 1993 ) are value relevant: that is, reflected in stock prices. Other studies document that mandatory disclosure of fair values reduces information asymmetry (e.g., Muller et al. 2011) , and that information asymmetry and information risk are lower when fair value disclosures are more reliable (Muller and Riedl 2002; Riedl and Serafeim 2011) .
This paper combines these two literatures by examining how the recognition versus disclosure of fair values for non-financial assets affects the informativeness of earnings.
Accordingly, we contribute to the literature on recognition versus disclosure by identifying a setting in which recognition and disclosure are concurrently allowable alternatives for an asset class that is highly material to sample firms' business model, allowing stronger tests (Bernard and Schipper 1994) . Furthermore, because our setting provides observable variation on measures of ex ante (perceived) fair value reliability as well as investor sophistication, our tests speak directly to the 'differential relevance/reliability' and 'incomplete processing' explanations for observed valuation differences across recognition and disclosure. This paper also contributes to the fair value literature by providing evidence on the interactive effects of financial statement 'geography' (i.e., recognition versus disclosure) and fair value reliability on the informativeness of earnings.
Hypothesis Development
Our analysis focuses on earnings informativeness, defined as the ability of earnings to capture or summarize information reflected in equity prices (Francis and Schipper 1999) . Its empirical implementation is motivated by models such as Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) and Kothari (2001) : noise in a signal reduces the price reaction to the signal (Hanlon et al. 2008 property fair values are recognized on the balance sheet, and changes in fair value recognized in net income) or "disclosure firms" (wherein investment property is recognized at amortized cost on the balance sheet, with mandatory footnote disclosure of these fair values). Third, the reported earnings of recognition firms reflects all three economic earnings components, whereas that of disclosure firms omits unrealized investment property fair value gains on retained property. Accordingly, we use the mandated disclosures of fair values to restate the 6 The R 2 from this regression captures the explained variation in the returns-earnings relation, and is an alternative measure of informativeness. However, consistent with prior literature, we do not focus on this measure (e.g., Francis et al. 2005 , footnote 1). 7 We refrain from referring to this coefficient as the "earnings response coefficient" (ERC) because our tests are based on long-window associations, rather than short-window reactions. For simplicity, we further assume no bias in fair value-based earnings (such as unconditional conservatism).
reported earnings of disclosure firms to reflect these unrealized fair value changes, and thus derive comparable earnings constructs across the recognition firms and disclosure firms (see Appendix A for details).
If stock returns fully capture firms' economic earnings, and if earnings reflects equivalent degrees of measurement error (noise), then we expect identical earnings informativeness for recognition firms and disclosure firms. Conversely, if the extent to which stock returns capture economic earnings, and/or the degree of measurement error in earnings, is lower for disclosure firms' earnings, we expect lower earnings informativeness for these firms. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:
The informativeness of fair value-based earnings for "disclosure firms" is lower than that for "recognition firms."
Our second set of hypotheses examines why recognition and disclosure have different degrees of earnings informativeness. As discussed previously, prior literature proposes two potential explanations regarding lower valuation of disclosed items relative to recognized items: 'differential relevance/reliability' and 'incomplete processing' (Bernard and Schipper 1994) . Under 'differential relevance/reliability,' differential informativeness of recognition firms' and disclosure firms' earnings is attributable to lower relevance and/or reliability of the disclosed information underlying disclosure firms' earnings. Under 'incomplete processing,' this differential informativeness is attributable to investors' incompletely processing the disclosed information underlying disclosure firms' earnings. Note that the 'differential relevance/reliability' explanation is consistent with disclosure firms' earnings having higher measurement error, whereas the 'incomplete processing' explanation is consistent with returns not fully capturing economic earnings for disclosure firms.
Distinguishing between these alternative explanations is important, as 'incomplete processing' implies mispricing and potentially negative capital allocation consequences, whereas 'differential relevance/reliability' is consistent with investors in efficient markets rationally discounting the earnings of disclosure firms.
This distinction has eluded prior literature; our European real estate industry setting allows us to provide direct evidence speaking to both potential explanations. Regarding 'differential relevance/reliability,' we assume that fair value information is equally relevant for the investors of recognition firms and disclosure firms. Therefore, differences in earnings informativeness should reflect lower reliability of disclosed relative to recognized investment property fair values; for expositional convenience, we thus focus on 'differential reliability.'
Specifically, we expect that recognized fair values are subject to greater internal (i.e., by management) as well as external (e.g., by auditors or other monitors) scrutiny, and are therefore more reliable than disclosed fair values. Less reliable fair value estimates, ceteris paribus, introduce more noise into the earnings component reflecting unrealized fair value changes. Accordingly, we expect that lower informativeness of earnings observed for disclosure firms can be attenuated through higher reliability of disclosure firms' investment property fair value estimates. This leads to the following hypothesis:
The lower informativeness of fair value-based earnings of "disclosure firms" relative to that of "recognition firms" is attenuated through higher reliability of the fair value measures.
Regarding 'incomplete processing,' we expect that less sophisticated investors, ceteris paribus, will face higher information processing costs with respect to disclosed information, causing them to underweight such information relative to more sophisticated investors.
Accordingly, we expect that any lower earnings informativeness for disclosure firms is attenuated through higher sophistication of investors. This leads to the following hypothesis:
The lower informativeness of fair value-based earnings of "disclosure firms" relative to that of "recognition firms" is attenuated through higher investor sophistication.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
Following Easton and Harris (1991) , Francis et al. (2005) and Hanlon et al. (2008) , we assess earnings informativeness by examining the slope coefficients from regressions of annual returns on annual earnings. Specifically, we base our tests on the following model:
(1) where:
R it firm i's cumulative stock return, measured by the total return index, starting three months after fiscal year t-1 and ending three months after fiscal year t; 9 and E it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported earnings for fiscal year t (is firm i's reported earnings for fiscal year t adjusted for measuring investment property at fair value), scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of year t.
Size it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported total assets (total assets adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), measured at the end of fiscal year t, in millions;
12
MTB it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's market capitalization, divided by firm i's reported common equity (divided by firm i's common equity adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), both measured at the end of fiscal year t;
Loss it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i's E it is negative, and 0 otherwise; and
Lev it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported short-term plus long-term debt, divided by the firm's total assets (divided by the firm's total assets adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), both measured at the end of the fiscal year t.
First, we include firm size (Size). While earlier studies predict greater size will reduce earnings informativeness, due to greater anticipation of accounting earnings for larger firms, (e.g., Freeman 1987), Chaney and Jeter (1992) provides evidence that the broader set of information available for large firms enables market participants to interpret financial statement information more completely, leading to decreased uncertainty; accordingly, we do not predict the sign of the coefficient interacting earnings and Size. Second, we include the market-to-book ratio (MTB). As growth opportunities have a positive effect on observed coefficients on earnings (Collins and Kothari 1989) , we predict a positive coefficient on the interaction of earnings and MTB. Third, we include an indicator variable for reported losses (Loss). As losses are more transitory than profits (Hayn 1995) , we predict a negative coefficient interacting earnings and Loss. Finally, we include leverage (Lev). As higher leverage reflects greater default risk, which reduces the coefficient on earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 1991) , we predict a negative coefficient on the interaction of earnings and Lev. 12 Inferences are unchanged to alternative size measures, including use of natural logarithm of total assets. 13 Note that all control variables for the disclosure firms are based on accounting numbers adjusted to reflect investment property fair values, which should better reflect these firms' underlying economics. Results are qualitatively unchanged using control variables based on disclosure firms' as-reported accounting numbers.
To assess our hypotheses, we augment Equation (1) 
where:
Discl it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i in year t is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values via footnote disclosure), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm," that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet and fair value changes in the income statement).
All other variables are as previously defined. The experimental variable is Discl, which partitions the sample into disclosure firms and recognition firms. If earnings informativeness is lower for earnings based on disclosed relative to recognized unrealized fair value changes, we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction of E x Discl (i.e., β 3 ) in Equation (2); this is our test of H 1 .
Our second set of hypotheses tests two explanations for differential informativeness of recognition firms' earnings relative to disclosure firms' earnings: 'differential reliability' and 'incomplete processing.' Specifically, consistent with the 'differential reliability' explanation, H 2A states that differences in coefficients on fair value-based earnings across disclosure and recognition firms are attenuated through higher reliability of disclosure firms' fair value measures. Consistent with the 'incomplete processing' explanation, H 2B states that differences in coefficients on fair value-based earnings across disclosure and recognition firms are attenuated through higher sophistication of disclosure firms' investors. To test these predictions, we augment Equation (2) as follows:
Ext it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i in year t employs an external appraiser to derive investment property fair values, and 0 otherwise (i.e., derives these fair values through internal management estimates); and CHS it is the percentage of closely held shares of firm i for fiscal year t.
To assess 'differential reliability' (H 2A ), we use Ext, which captures a firm's use of an external monitor (i.e. a property appraisal firm) to assess investment property fair values.
Consistent with Dietrich et al. (2001) and Muller and Riedl (2002) , we expect that investment property firms employing external property appraisers are perceived by market participants as having more reliable investment property fair value estimates than firms that estimate fair values relying on internal staff. If differences in the informativeness of fair value-based earnings across disclosure and recognition firms are explained by (perceived) differences in fair value measurement reliability across these groups (i.e., H 2A ), we expect the coefficient on the interaction of E x Discl x Ext , (i.e., γ 7 ) in Equation (3a) to be positive.
To assess 'incomplete processing' (H 2B ), we use CHS, which captures the percentage of a firm's shares owned by institutional investors and other block holders. To the extent that such owners are more sophisticated (i.e., incur lower information processing costs related to disclosed information), we expect that the disclosed information of investment property firms with higher institutional ownership is processed more completely than that of firms with lower institutional ownership. If differences in the informativeness of fair value-based earnings across disclosure and recognition firms are explained by differences in investor sophistication across these groups (i.e., H 2B ), we expect the coefficient on the interaction of E
x Discl x CHS, (i.e., φ 7 ) in Equation (3b) to be positive.
V. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Sample Description
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that recognition firms are more likely to employ external appraisers (86%) relative to disclosure firms (68%), whereas disclosure firms have significantly higher institutional/ block ownership (CHS of 65% for disclosure firms, versus 41% for recognition firms).
Descriptive statistics
Regarding the control variables, disclosure firms tend to be smaller in terms of total assets (Size), have higher market-to-book ratios (MTB), and are less leveraged. Finally, based on reported balance sheet amounts, investment property represents a significantly larger portion of total assets for recognition firms (72%) compared to disclosure firms (52%).
Multivariate Results
Next, we present the results of our hypothesis tests in Table 3 . Four regression specifications are presented: column (1) presents baseline results excluding experimental variables based on Equation (1); column (2) adds the experimental variables to test H 1 , based on Equation (2); and columns (3a) and (3b) add the experimental variables to test H 2A and H 2B , respectively, based on Equations (3a) and (3b). The main coefficients of interest are highlighted in bold.
Turning to the base regression results, column (1) shows a significantly positive coefficient on earnings (coefficient = 1.56, t-statistic = 7.30), indicating that earnings, on average, is informative for our sample firms. The size of the coefficient is consistent with material transitory elements in the earnings figure, which is expected since our earnings variable includes realized as well as unrealized fair value changes relating to investment property. The interactions of E with our four control variables yield significant coefficients for Size, Loss, and Lev, indicating that earnings informativeness is higher for larger firms, and lower for firms reporting losses or having higher leverage. 14 The overall model fit (R 2 = 21%) is consistent with prior literature. We conclude from these baseline results that our returns-on-earnings regression is well-specified.
In our test of H 1 , column (2) In our test of H 2B , column (3b) shows an insignificant coefficient on E x Discl x CHS (coefficient = -0.01, t-statistic = 0.06). This suggests investor sophistication is not significantly related to earnings informativeness, and fails to find evidence supporting H 2B .
Overall, the results of 
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
Controlling for Self-Selection into Recognition vs. Disclosure Groupings
Having observed that earnings informativeness is lower for firms that disclose (versus recognize) investment property fair values, we now investigate if particular characteristics that distinguish "disclosure firms" from "recognition firms" can explain this difference. That is, we examine the characteristics explaining why some firms chose disclosure, whereas others chose recognition, to rule out that these properties explain our findings. We use the following probit regression to investigate firms' choice to be a "disclosure firm" (i.e., to disclose investment property fair values under the cost model): 
Discl it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i in year t is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values via footnote disclosure), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm," that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet and fair value changes in the income statement);
Size it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported total assets (total assets adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), measured at the end of fiscal year t, in millions; with larger firms providing more transparent reporting information. We include BigN to capture the effect of auditor on this reporting choice; as large audit firms are more likely to encourage clients to adopt recognition, the predicted coefficient is negative. We include Switch to identify systematic differences between firms applying either the fair value or cost model permanently, versus those that later switch reporting models; the predicted coefficient is positive. Next, we include membership in the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA), the primary real estate association in Europe; as EPRA explicitly advocates use of the fair value model, the predicted coefficient is negative. We include Pre_GAAP to capture the path dependency of firms' financial reporting choices in line with their response to the demand for accounting information (e.g., Ball et al. 2000) ; as firms domiciled in countries in 15 Note that the notion of a commitment to transparency should be correlated with other firm-level reporting choices, including the decision to employ an external appraiser (captured by our indicator variable Ext). As such, controlling for self-selection into the recognitions and disclosure firm groupings likely mitigates selfselection into the groups of firms using versus not using an external appraiser. We further note that including Ext as an explanatory variable into Equation (4) does not change the results.
which recognition of investment property fair values was prevalent before IFRS adoption are more likely to continue using this model under IFRS, the predicted coefficient is negative.
We include MLiq to capture the difficulty of valuing the firm's investment property portfolio; as higher market liquidity should lower firms' costs of providing reliable investment property fair values, the predicted coefficient is negative. Finally, we include firms percentage of the overall asset base that are investment property (IP_Exposure); as higher exposure to these assets may bias firms towards adopting recognition, the predicted coefficient is negative.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the probit model in Equation (4), estimated at the time of IFRS adoption (i.e., when the decision to be a recognition firm or a disclosure firm is first made suggests that the model explains a fair portion of the variation in this choice.
We then use the inverse Mills ratios obtained from Panel B to re-assess our Table 3 findings. As we expect the determinants of this accounting choice to be associated with the returns-earnings relation, rather than with returns per se, we include the inverse Mills ratios by interacting them with the earnings variable, E, rather than as a main effect. 17 Panel A of 
Balance Sheet Specification
Several prior studies also assess the valuation implications of recognition versus disclosure using a balance sheet, or "levels", specification (e.g., Davis-Friday et al. 1999; Ahmed et al. 2006 ). Accordingly, we parallel our development of H 1 using the following balance sheet specification that models the firm's market value of equity as a function of its assets (investment property and other assets) and liabilities in place:
MVE it = ζ 0 + ζ 1 IP it + ζ 2 OtherAssets it + ζ 3 Liabilities it + ζ 4 Discl it + ζ 5 IP it x Discl it + ε it (5) where:
MVE it is firm i's market value of equity for fiscal year t;
IP it is firm i's reported ("recognition firms") or disclosed ("disclosure firms") fair value of investment property for fiscal year t;
OtherAssets it is firm i's other (i.e., non-investment property) assets for fiscal year t defined as firm i's reported total assets for fiscal year t minus firm i's reported investment property for fiscal year t; and Liabilities it is firm i's total liabilities for fiscal year t defined as firm i's total assets for fiscal year t minus firm i's common equity for fiscal year t. For disclosure firms, Liabilities is adjusted by an additional deferred tax liability that arises from measuring investment property at fair value. (i.e., ρ 9 in Equation (6b)) to be negative.
18 Table 5 reports the results, with a base model in Column (1) that appears wellspecified.
19 Column (2) presents our alternative test of H 1 . Of primary interest, the interaction of IP x Discl is negative as predicted, but insignificant (coefficient = -0.02, tstatistic = 0.89); thus, we fail to find evidence that recognition and disclosure firms differ in terms of explanatory power of investment property fair values for stock price on average.
However, results presented in column (3a) show that the negative coefficient on the interaction of IP x Discl becomes significant (coefficient = -0.17, t-statistic = 3.33) when controlling for the reliability of fair value measurement through Ext, our indicator variable reflecting the use of an external appraisal expert. Of primary interest, the coefficient on the interaction of E x Discl x Ext is significantly positive (coefficient = 0.14, t-statistic = 2.35), as expected under H 2A . This provides evidence that lower explanatory power of disclosed versus recognized investment property fair values for stock price is mitigated by the increased reliability provided by external appraisals, supporting H 1 as well as H 2A . Finally, 18 Results are unchanged to including common shares outstanding as an additional variable to control for scale (Barth and Kallapur 1996) . 19 Specifically, the coefficient on IP is significantly positive (0.94, t-statistic = 9.81), suggesting that investment property fair values, on average, are associated with market values. In addition, the coefficient values for IP and Other Assets (Liabilities) are consistent with theory, i.e., close to 1 (-1); and the R 2 of 86% is in line with prior literature. Column (3b) shows an insignificant coefficient on the interaction of IP x Discl x CHS. Thus, we again fail to find evidence supporting H 2B . Overall, the results from the balance sheet specification are consistent with the main results reported in Table 3 .
Alternative Specifications Including Earnings Changes
Other earnings informativeness studies use regressions of returns on independent variables including earnings changes (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Hanlon et al. 2008) . To confirm the robustness of our results, we estimate the following regressions:
Earnings changes model:
Earnings levels and changes model:
ΔE it is firm i's change in E it for fiscal year t, and E it is defined as above. (Note that both (7a) and (7b) with Discl x CHS in the earnings levels and changes model, to be positive. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper documents that recognition versus disclosure of fair values affects earnings informativeness by showing that earnings based on disclosed fair values is less informative than earnings based on recognized fair values. Further, the paper provides evidence that this difference appears attributable to lower ex ante reliability of the disclosed fair value information; we fail to find evidence consistent with incomplete processing of disclosed fair values by investors. We provide this evidence in the setting of the European investment property (i.e., real estate) industry. This setting is advantageous as it provides a relatively 20 We note that the negative coefficient on ΔE x Discl x CHS may capture information asymmetry versus investor sophistication.
homogenous primary operating asset (investment property), for which the relevant IFRS provide a key reporting choice: a subset of firms recognizes this primary asset at fair value (i.e., "recognition firms"), while another subset recognizes investment property at amortized cost, but discloses the fair value in the notes (i.e., "disclosure firms"). The mandated disclosure of these fair values allows us to derive fair value-based earnings figures that are directly comparable across the two sets of firms.
We exploit this setting to first examine how recognition versus disclosure affects earnings informativeness, modeling earnings as a signal that can be affected by noise that reduces the price reaction to this signal (e.g., Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988) . Following the literature on recognition versus disclosure (Bernard and Schipper 1994) , we expect that disclosed financial data will have greater noise (i.e., more measurement error) relative to recognized financial data, owing to greater scrutiny of recognized data by both internal and external parties. Consistent with this expectation, we find that earnings of disclosure firms has lower informativeness relative to earnings of recognition firms.
We then add to research on recognition versus disclosure by addressing whether the above differences may be explained by 'differential reliability' (i.e., disclosed information appropriately being viewed by rational agents as having lower reliability) and/or 'incomplete processing' (i.e., inefficient markets). Using as a proxy for fair value measurement reliability firms' use of an external appraiser, we provide evidence that the lower earnings informativeness for disclosure firms is attenuated through their use of this external monitor.
This finding is consistent with disclosure firms improving earnings informativeness through greater ex ante reliability of their fair value measures, evidenced through use of an external appraiser. However, we fail to find evidence of incomplete processing of disclosed fair values by investors. Specifically, we fail to find differences in earnings informativeness across disclosure firms' level of closely held shares, used as a proxy for sophisticated investors. Results for all of these findings are robust to numerous sensitivity analyses, including controlling for self-selection, use a levels (i.e., balance sheet) estimation versus a changes (i.e., returns) estimation, and incorporating earnings changes into the regressions.
Taken together, our results contribute to the recognition versus disclosure literature (Bernard and Schipper 1994) in two ways. First, we provide evidence that earnings signals derived from disclosed financial information are noisier relative to those derived from recognized financial information. Second, we document that greater ex ante reliabilityreflected in the use of an external monitor-increases earnings informativeness. This latter finding is consistent with market agents in an efficient market perceiving disclosed information as having lower reliability, whereas it is inconsistent with incomplete processing of disclosed information by irrational agents. Distinguishing between these alternative explanations has eluded prior literature; it is important, as 'incomplete processing' implies mispricing and potentially negative capital allocation consequences, while 'differential reliability' is consistent with rational behavior on the part of investors.
We note that our findings may not generalize to industries in which non-financial assets measured at fair value are of low significance, or in which distinguishing across different levels of fair value measurement reliability is non-trivial for investors. On the other hand, our results suggest that perceived disadvantages of disclosure may not, in fact, be caused by the 'geography' of the information per se, but by (perceived) reliability differences. Therefore, they are likely to be of interest to standard setters generally, in their debate whether recognition and disclosure of financial information are substitutes, and specifically in the context of convergence efforts between the FASB and IASB, who are deliberating to require real estate firms to recognize investment property at fair value, which would eliminate the choice now existing under IFRS. On 1 January 20X1, each firm purchases two property assets, Property 1 and Property 2, for $500 each. Each property has a 10-year useful life, with an assumed pattern of value decline of straight-line depreciation.
On 31 December 20X1, each firm sells its Property 1 for $750, and retains Property 2. The fair value of Property 2 is assessed at $800. Under the disclosure requirements of IAS 40, Firm A discloses this fair value in the notes to the financial statements.
Throughout the year 20X1, each firm collects rent of $100 on each property asset. Expenses and income taxes are ignored for simplicity. While Firm A's earnings exclude the unrealized fair value gain on the retained Property 2 and includes depreciation expense on both properties, Firm B's earnings include the unrealized fair value gain on the retained Property 2 and excludes depreciation expense. Consequently, Firm A recognizes a higher disposal gain because the carrying amount of its Property 1 at the time of sale is $450, whereas it is $500 for Firm B's Property 1.
Panel B.
Calculating restated fair value-based earnings for "disclosure firms"
We restate the earnings of disclosure firms to make it consistent with the earnings of recognition firms, obtaining fair value-based earnings for the disclosure firms, using the following formula:
E is earnings of "disclosure firms" adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value;
E_Cost is earnings of "disclosure firms" as reported under the cost model;
BV_Cost is book value of investment properties measured under the cost model;
FV is fair value of investment properties as disclosed in the footnotes of "disclosure firms"; and tax is the average corporate income tax rate.
In effect, Equation (A1) substitutes the change in investment property fair values for the change in amortized cost-based carrying amounts, and subtracts the change in the associated deferred tax liability. This illustration shows that the fair value disclosures of disclosure firms allow investors to restate the earnings of disclosure firms to make it equivalent to the earnings of recognition firms. In this paper, we use the restated fair value-based earnings of disclosure firms to compare their informativeness with the fair value-based earnings of recognition firms.
APPENDIX B Variable Definitions Dependent Variable
R it is firm i's cumulative stock return, measured by the total return index, starting three months after fiscal year t-1 and ending three months after fiscal year t.
Experimental Variables
E it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported earnings for fiscal year t (is firm i's reported earnings for fiscal year t adjusted for measuring investment property at fair value), scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of year t.
(See Appendix A for details on restating disclosure firms' reported earnings to derive "fair value-based" earnings.)
Ext it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i in year t employs an external appraiser to derive investment property fair values, and 0 otherwise (i.e., derives these fair values through internal management estimates).
CHS it is the percentage of closely held shares of firm i for fiscal year t.
Control Variables
Size it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported total assets (total assets adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), measured at the end of fiscal year t, in millions.
MTB it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's market capitalization, divided by firm i's reported common equity (divided by firm i's common equity adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), both measured at the end of fiscal year t.
Loss it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i's E it is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Lev it for "recognition firms" ("disclosure firms") is firm i's reported shortterm plus long-term debt, divided by the firm's total assets (divided by the firm's total assets adjusted to reflect measuring investment property at fair value), both measured at the end of the fiscal year t. IP_Exposure i is firm i's reported ("recognition firms") or disclosed ("disclosure firms") fair value of investment property, divided by Size, for fiscal year t.
APPENDIX B (cont'd) Choice Model Variables
Balance Sheet Specification Variables
MVE it is firm i's market value of equity for fiscal year t.
IP it is firm i's reported ("recognition firms") or disclosed ("disclosure firms") fair value of investment property for fiscal year t.
OtherAssets it is firm i's other (i.e., non-investment property) assets for fiscal year t defined as firm i's reported total assets for fiscal year t minus firm i's reported investment property for fiscal year t.
Liabilities it is firm i's total liabilities for fiscal year t defined as firm i's total assets for fiscal year t minus firm i's common equity for fiscal year t. For "disclosure" firms, Liabilities is adjusted by an additional deferred tax liability that arises from measuring investment property at fair value. (1), (2), and (3a) of Table 3 . (1), (2), and (3a) of Table 3 (N = 525). The statistics for the variable CHS are reported for 462 observations (recognition firms: N = 395; disclosure firms: N = 67). All variables are defined in Appendix B. Across all columns, the sample includes investment property firms domiciled in European Union countries over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the indicated tests of differences in means (t-statistics in parentheses) and medians (z-statistics in parentheses). [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Across all specifications, the dependent variable is R it , firm i's cumulative stock return, measured by the total return index, starting three months after fiscal year t-1 and ending three months after fiscal year t.
The experimental variables include interactions with three constructs; experimental interactions testing our hypotheses are indicated in bold. First, Discl is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values in the footnotes in year t), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm" that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet). The coefficient on E x Discl is used to test whether the informativeness of fair-value based earnings for disclosure firms is equivalent to that for recognition firms (i.e., H 1 ). Second, Ext is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i uses an external appraiser to derive recognized or disclosed investment property fair values in year t, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on E x Discl x Ext is used to test whether the lower informativeness of fair-value based earnings of disclosure firms relative to that of recognition firms is attenuated through higher reliability of the fair value measures (i.e., H 2A ). Third, CHS is the percentage of closely held shares of firm i for fiscal year t. The coefficient on E x Discl x CHS is used to test whether the lower informativeness of fair-value based earnings of disclosure firms relative to that of recognition firms is attenuated through higher investor sophistication (i.e., H 2B ). All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors, with t-statistics provided in parentheses. Experimental coefficient combinations are indicated in bold. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the indicated one-or two-tailed tests. N varies across specifications due to data requirements. Table 3 regressions including the Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) obtained from Panel B above. E x IMR is intended to control for firms' self-selection into the recognition versus disclosure groupings. Across all specifications, the dependent variable is R it , firm i's cumulative stock return, measured by the total return index, starting three months after fiscal year t-1 and ending three months after fiscal year t. The experimental variables include interactions with three constructs; experimental interactions testing our hypotheses are indicated in bold. First, Discl is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values in the footnotes in year t), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm" that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet). The coefficient on E x Discl is used to test whether the informativeness of fair-value based earnings for disclosure firms is equivalent to that for recognition firms (i.e., H 1 ). Second, Ext is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i uses an external appraiser to derive recognized or disclosed investment property fair values in year t, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on E x Discl x Ext is used to test whether the lower informativeness of fair-value based earnings of disclosure firms relative to that of recognition firms is attenuated through higher reliability of the fair value measures (i.e., H 2A ). Third, CHS is the percentage of closely held shares of firm i for fiscal year t. The coefficient on E x Discl x CHS is used to test whether the lower informativeness of fair-value based earnings of disclosure firms relative to that of recognition firms is attenuated through higher investor sophistication (i.e., H 2B ). All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
Panel B examines the determinants of firms' choice to disclose versus recognize investment property fair values, as allowed under International Accounting Standard 40. The dependent variable is Discl, an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values in the footnotes in year t), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm" that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet). All other variables are defined in Appendix B. For this panel, the estimation is performed for the year of IFRS adoption, leading to N = 166 representing 166 unique firms.
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors, with t-statistics provided in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the indicated one-or two-tailed tests. N varies across specifications due to data requirements. The experimental variables include interactions with three constructs; experimental interactions testing our hypotheses are indicated in bold. First, Discl is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values in the footnotes in year t), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm" that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet). The coefficient on IP x Discl is used as an alternative test of whether the explanatory power of investment property fair values for stock price for disclosure firms is equivalent to that for recognition firms (i.e., H 1 ). Second, Ext is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i uses an external appraiser to derive recognized or disclosed investment property fair values in year t, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on IP x Discl x Ext is used as an alternative test of whether the lower explanatory power of investment property fair values for stock price for disclosure firms relative to recognition firms is attenuated through higher reliability of the fair value measures (i.e., H 2A ). Third, CHS is the percentage of closely held shares of firm i for fiscal year t. The coefficient on E x Discl x CHS is used as an alternative test of whether the lower explanatory power of investment property fair values for stock price for disclosure firms relative to recognition firms is attenuated through higher investor sophistication (i.e., H 2B ). All other variables are defined in the Appendix B.
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors, with t-statistics provided in parentheses. Experimental coefficients (or coefficient combinations) are indicated in bold. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the indicated one-or twotailed tests. N varies across specifications due to data requirements. This table presents sensitivity analyses that re-examine the effect of recognizing versus disclosing fair values on earnings informativeness by including earnings changes. The sample includes investment property firms domiciled in European Union countries over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Across all specifications, the dependent variable is R it , firm i's cumulative stock return, measured by the total return index, starting three months after fiscal year t-1 and ending three months after fiscal year t.
Panel A includes earnings changes, and related interactions, as independent variables. Panel B includes both earnings levels and earnings changes, and related interactions, as independent variables.
The experimental variables include interactions with three constructs; experimental interactions testing our hypotheses are indicated in bold. First, Discl is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a "disclosure firm" (i.e., discloses investment property fair values in the footnotes in year t), and 0 otherwise (i.e., is a "recognition firm" that recognizes these fair values on the balance sheet). The coefficient on E x Discl is used to test whether the informativeness of fair-value based earnings for disclosure firms is equivalent to that for recognition firms (i.e., H 1 ). Second, Ext is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i uses an external appraiser to derive recognized or disclosed investment property fair values in year t, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on E x Discl x Ext is used to test whether the lower informativeness of fair-value based earnings of disclosure firms relative to that of recognition firms is attenuated through higher reliability of the fair value measures (i.e., H 2A ). Third, CHS is the percentage of closely held shares of firm i for fiscal year t. The coefficient on E x Discl x CHS is used to test whether the lower informativeness of fairvalue based earnings of disclosure firms relative to that of recognition firms is attenuated through higher investor sophistication (i.e., H 2B ). All other variables are defined in Appendix B.
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors, with t-statistics provided in parentheses. Experimental coefficients (or coefficient combinations) are indicated in bold. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the indicated one-or two-tailed tests. N varies across specifications due to data requirements.
